Check your inbox!
Reset your password with the link we just sent to your email.
Please reload and retry in a moment.
Please reload and retry in a moment.
16th Feb 2016
First and foremost, the business community does not do well with uncertainty. The prospect of the UK being forced to renegotiate trade agreements with dozens of countries while enforcing new border passage rules for its own citizens and visitors to Britian, along with a cloudy future for exports to the UK's single largest market, Europe, are already having a chilling effect on the business climate in the country. Should an exit become reality, a drop in foreign investment into the UK and a multi-year effort to rethink Britain's role in the world, and the price at which it participates at large look inevitable. For a market absurdly dependent on foreign investment and housing in particular, that's not good.
Within the UK, an exit raises the tensions surrounding national identity considerably. The country survived the Scottish independence referendum vote in 2014, which featured a high 84.6% voter turnout with a 44% minority aiming to leave the UK. Scotland is a net beneficiary of EU related funding and social investment, and losing that funding as a result of Brexit could result in harder fiscal realities in the northern country. The loss would be substantial enough to set in motion a set of hard economic incentives that would result in Scotland devolving from the UK in favor of EU membership on its own.
So that leaves Wales and England, anchored by London, as an emergent and hyperbolic city-state on the global stage. Such a scenario would have significant impacts on the viability of London itself as a global financial center and may serve to amplify its reputation as a neo-urban area - the kind of place that exists between nations, not so much as a nation.
Singapore, Hong Kong, Dubai... today's centers of financial operations and leading magnets for the creative class thrive because they contain 'advantages' over 'normal' countries, with a set of objectives and economic activities well suited for 21st century operations: mobile and highly educated populations, a lack of geographic baggage, and the ability to compete for global resources on a nimble basis, magnified by their human density and a propensity to trade taxe rates for business consideration.
These micro-nations wield outsize influence but compete on efficiency and market dynamics for the attention of the global business community. Part of the reason they succeed is because they are rare - and they depend in turn on security alliances and bargains with traditional national powers.
For London this could feel like a liberating advantage, but such scenarios work best in times of peace and security and there is no guarantee such eras will remain indefinitely. They also tend to benefit corporations at the expense of the electorate and convergent income equality at large. As Europe heaves and splinters under the stresses of its own making - refugees, economic blight, currency imbalances - all the things that argue for individual members to exit or find another way, outsiders find benefits and strategic advantage in this weakness.
Without the UK, Europe is certainly reduced, but UK influence would be reduced even more. Without Europe, the UK strengthens the hands of those who benefit from western bloc incoherence.
In a world where chaos stalks the outer edges of the European experiment, that's a reduction in influence either can ill afford.